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ABSTRACT
To counter partisan polarization, political theorists like John Rawls and political
leaders like Barack Obama have sought to locate and express consensual elements of
American culture that can appeal to or at least be accepted by people having political,
religious, moral, and philosophical differences. While orthodox pluralism previously
recognized the need for a normative consensus to regulate political struggles, a new
principled pluralism expands on the contents of the American consensus by proposing
many political principles and philosophical assumptions that are articulated at an in-
termediate level of abstraction, that express the emerging (though not always present)
common sensibilities of most Americans, and that can be used to justify political pol-
icies and practices.
American political culture has been depicted as having had broad, perhaps
consensual, support for various liberal, republican, capitalist, democratic, re-
ligious, and ascriptive ideals, though public support for such elements of our
culture has often been seen as increasing or decreasing over time and sometimes
periodic or cyclical (see, e.g., Hartz 1955; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Sandel
1996; Smith 1997; Huntington 2004; Putnam and Campbell 2010). But most
current commentary and analyses of American politics emphasize our “culture
war” (see, e.g., Jacoby 2014; Pew Research Center for the People and Press
2014). Liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are portrayed as be-
ing in deep conflict over what are and what should be our governing ideals. In
this portrait, whatever consensus was previously thought to be part of Amer-
ican culture has declined, if not vanished altogether.
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Among political philosophers and theorists, however, there are claims that
political communities like the United States are best characterized as having
and needing both conflicting and consensual political values and orientations.
John Rawls (2005, 140) claimed that citizens of pluralist societies “have two
views, a comprehensive and a political view, and that their overall view can be
divided into two parts, suitably related.” First, people hold “incompatible yet
reasonable comprehensive doctrines,” such as various religious creeds and
moralities like utilitarianism and Kantian liberalism (99, 134). The irrecon-
cilability of such comprehensive doctrines means that any of them could guide
our politics “only by the oppressive use of state power” (37). Thus, a second
“freestanding political view” that is acceptable to people having otherwise
irreconcilable moral orientations is needed to have and sustain political sta-
bility (12). As described below, the contents of this political view were char-
acterized by Rawls as “an overlapping consensus” on such matters as basic
individual rights, constitutional arrangements, social structures, and distrib-
utive principles. In short, Rawls depicted the political culture of a pluralist
society like America as containing both conflicting comprehensive religious,
moral, and philosophical doctrines and a consensual public philosophy. People
in stable pluralist societies simultaneously hold both views in such a way that
political conflict is minimized or at least manageable.
William Connolly has also claimed that democratic citizens can have and
should have two views—what he calls a bicameral orientation:
There is, first, the faith, doctrine, creed, ideology, or philosophy (I do not
distinguish sharply between these) that you adopt as an engaged parti-
san. Marxism, say. Or a branch of Christianity. Or a particular vision of
science. OrHinduism, Islam,Orthodox Judaism, Kantianism, Rawlsian-
ism, neoconservatism, or pragmatism. There is, second, the engrained
sense that you should exercise presumptive receptivity toward others
when drawing that faith, creed, or philosophy into the public realm. You
love your creed; you seldom leave it entirely in the closet when you enter
politics. But you appreciate how it appears opaque and profoundly con-
testable to many who do not participate in it. (2005, 4)
For political theorists, Connolly’s emphasis on comprehensive partisan ideo-
logical doctrines is an obvious and important supplement to Rawls’s focus on
our religious, moral, and philosophical differences. But it is Connolly’s second
orientation affirming “a decent respect for the persistent diversity of the hu-
man condition” that most resembles Rawls’s “freestanding political view”
and produces civility and stability.
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Connolly has developed a “new pluralism” that draws on an earlier plu-
ralist recognition of the need for an “underlying normative consensus that
regulates conflicts among groups because it is the intersubjective product of
society as a whole,” but he has radicalized this pluralism by insisting that it
contains normative ideals that are more critical, inclusive, and egalitarian than
earlier pluralist formulations (Campbell and Schoolman 2008, 4–11). By em-
phasizing that our cultural consensus contains normative ideals that on critical
reflection we ought to embrace, Connolly opens the door to conceiving Rawls’s
overlapping consensus broadly—to include not just those ideas that we do hold
but also those ideals we ought to and potentially can hold. According to Con-
nolly (2005, 5), the ideals of pluralism appeal to most Americans, but dogmatic
and aggressive campaigns by powerful agents, such as those who participated in
McCarthyism in the 1950s, can “overturn preliminary dispositions in favor of
pluralism,” prompting concern “that such campaigns are becoming hyperactive
today.”
Recent neglect of any consensual public philosophy is surprising, because it
has been given strong voice by President Barack Obama. In his philosophical
audition for the presidency, Audacity of Hope, Obama claimed that despite
increasing partisan conflict, “at the core of the American experience are a set
of ideals that continue to stir our collective conscience; a common set of val-
ues that bind us together despite our differences; a running thread of hope that
makes our improbable experiment in democracy work” (2006, 8). Indeed, both
in Audacity and throughout his career, Obama’s bicameral orientation—his
pluralist as well as his liberal commitments—was and has been plainly evident.
Obama provides an excellent opportunity to understand how politicians, es-
pecially presidents, can give voice to America’s consensual political ideals. As
David Siemers (2009, xii–xiii) points out, Obama has “rummaged through po-
litical philosophy, discarding most of it as impractical, but [has found] value in
certain key ideas, thinkers, and concepts,” especially those congruent with
“widely shared cultural norms.” BeyondAudacity, we now have access tomany
speeches given during his two successful presidential campaigns and his first
80 months in office and to his policy stances; these provide a rich basis for ex-
amining Obama’s bicameral orientations.1
My main goal in this article is to provide a broad view of the American
political consensus. I suggest that beneath the divisive partisan ideologies that
now characterize our politics there lies an often hidden set of political princi-
1. Many of Obama’s more memorable speeches parallel the ideas he provided in Au-
dacity. For ease of accessing Obama’s public philosophy, I usually reference Audacity rather
than his speeches, though I sometimes provide footnotes to the speeches where these ideas are
expanded on or repeated.
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ples and philosophical assumptions that I call principled pluralism. I provide
an expanded version of what pluralists have seen as the underlying normative
consensus that has broad appeal to most Americans. My account of principled
pluralism supposes that the consensual aspects of American culture cannot be
adequately understood by finding widespread support for such abstract values
as freedom, equality, economic security, social order, morality, individualism,
and patriotism; after all, even if most Americans do hold these values to some
degree, they define and rank them differently along predictable lines of reli-
gious, partisan, and ideological division (Jacoby2014, 758–69). Tounderstand
principled pluralism, it is important to go beyond locating commitments to
such common values; its ideals must be presented in greater specificity in the
form of political principles and philosophical assumptions that provide widely
accepted answers to the enduring issues of politics. My account also supposes
that the principles and assumptions of pluralism become clarified by juxtapos-
ing them to more partisan views—in this case, Obama’s liberalism.2
My second goal is to situate principled pluralism within Rawls’s political
thought. Because Rawls’s overlapping consensus has become the primary con-
ceptual tool used by contemporary political theorists for locating our consensual
ideals and recognizing their critical role in advancing political legitimacy and
stability, it is important to see how principled pluralism contributes to the
Rawlsian tradition.
My third goal is to suggest that Obama provides evidence that principled
pluralism is more than an abstract political theory; it has worked its way into
practical politics. BecauseObamahas often expressed and appeared to be guided
by the norms of principled pluralism, I argue that his pluralism has sometimes
competedwith his liberalism and thus explains his timid embrace of liberal goals
during his presidency. This argument challenges the view ofmany commentators
and scholars that Obama’s liberal principles often are trumped by his “post-
partisanship.” For example, Milkis et al. (2012) argue that Obama balances his
Democratic partisanship and his liberal principles with a willingness to work
collaboratively with congressional Republicans. Like most analyses offered by
political scientists, this characterization has the virtue of realism, of emphasizing
the conflicting institutional, electoral, and political pressures that Obama has
faced. However, it ignores Obama’s idealism and the role that political principles
often play in the activities of political leaders (Schumaker and Kelly 2012).
2. In an earlier text, I have described the main ideals of contemporary liberalism and
major contributors to this ideology (Schumaker 2008). There I also used a version of the
convergence method (as discussed below) to provide a preliminary overview of principled
pluralism.
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Obama has emphasized abstract ideals throughout his political career. A focus
on the tensions and conflicts among Obama’s ideals might well serve as a useful
correction to the very real tensions arising from conflicting interests and insti-
tutional pressures that are stressed by post-partisan analyses.
My fourth goal is to clarify the role of philosophical assumptions in political
thought. Beyond providing a fairly comprehensive conception of philosophical
assumptions, I suggest that understanding the philosophical assumptions of
alternative theories helps differentiate one from another. I suggest that Obama’s
philosophical assumptions help explain his greater allegiance to pluralism than
liberalism. I hope that better articulations of the philosophical assumptions of
pluralism will help people moderate their partisan views and see the attractions
of pluralism.
In section 1, I introduce principled pluralism and its relationship to Rawls’s
overlapping consensus.
In section 2, I discuss some of the political principles of pluralism. I first
consider Obama’s commitments to toleration, individual rights, constitutional-
ism, and a broad array of social structures. I then suggest that Obama has dis-
tributive principles that reflect the “weaker” or “thinner” pluralist ideas that
Rawls adopted in Political Liberalism, but that he has also articulated justice
principles that are attuned to the “stronger” or “thicker” liberal egalitarian
principles stressed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice.3 His speeches suggest that
he believes that Rawls’s principles inATheory of Justice, at least in moderated
form, should be part of the American consensus and that there may be a path to
their being so in the future. But I leave unresolved here the question whether
Obama is more personally committed to weaker pluralist or stronger liberal
justice principles. A consideration of his deeper philosophical assumptions is
needed to discover Obama’s most basic public philosophy.
Because Rawls was careful to make his overlapping consensus independent
of (or “freestanding” from) conflicting and controversial philosophical ideas,
his (and other’s) discussions of the contents of that consensus have failed to
consider whether there can be rational and/or intuitive agreement on philo-
sophical assumptions that are the basis of and help justify the political prin-
ciples of pluralism as discussed in section 2. I argue in section 3 that this defi-
ciency in Rawlsian thought can be rectified by considering how Obama has
3. A Theory of Justice was originally published in 1971, though all citations to it here
come from the revised edition published in 1999. It can be interpreted as expressing Rawls’s
more partisan outlook, while the subsequently published Political Liberalism expresses his
more pluralistic political views. Political Liberalism was originally published in 1993, but I
reference the 2005 edition, which contains a new part 4 clarifying his views.
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expressed and held philosophical assumptions that reveal a broader pluralist
consensus than provided by Rawls. These suggest Obama’s greater commit-
ment to pluralism than to partisan liberalism.
1. PRINCIPLED PLURALISM
Pluralism is widely discussed as a feature of American political culture but is
understood in various ways.
Sociologists think of pluralism as a condition of diverse identities. While
Obama applauds America’smulticultural pluralism and indeed embodies it in
his own person, pluralist ideals are not just about appreciating racial, ethnic,
and other such differences; they are more complex, abstract, and intellectual.
Moral philosophers tend to think of pluralism as a condition in which
many ideals and values compete for people’s allegiances. While Obama rec-
ognizes the existence ofmoral pluralism, he believes that there exists in Amer-
ican political culture more consensus on meaningful ideals than is usually ac-
knowledged; on matters of moral values, “we are becoming more, not less,
alike” (Obama 2006, 51). But principled pluralism runs deeper than merely
acknowledging and/or de-emphasizing moral differences.
Political commentators often suggest that vulgar pluralists too readily aban-
don theirmoral andpartisan principles andvalues to bend tooppositional forces.
While pluralism no doubt involves compromises, merely “splitting the differ-
ence” can fail to provide political stability. For example, Henry Clay’s “Great
Compromise of 1850” inflamed rather than calmed the conflicting passions that
led to the Civil War (Troy 2012, 47). And Bill Clinton’s “triangulation”—pro-
posing policy solutions “between the old positions of the two parties, yet above
themaswell”—wasoften regardedas“waffling” and“spineless centrism” (228–
44). Perhaps Obama is a vulgar pluralist who bends too easily to the opposition,
but the argument here is that he is a principled pluralist who has sought to find
common ground for policy compromises in principles that are, or ought to be,
acceptable to partisan opponents.
Political scientists normally thinkofpluralismas a theory ofAmericanpolitics
developed by Robert Dahl (1961, 1967) and his associates that approached
paradigmatic status a half century ago. This orthodox pluralism suggested that
political issues are democratically resolved when power is widely distributed
among many interests in society. Such dispersion of power was thought to bring
about policy compromises that approximate the public interest and justice—
producing outcomes that benefit most people and that distributed benefits and
burdens fairly. Orthodox pluralism did not long survive as the leading para-
digm of American political science, as some critics, such as William Domhoff
(1978), contested its ability to provide an accurate account of the distribution
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of power and privilege in America, and other critics, such as Theodore Lowi
(1979), doubted that pluralistic power struggles could produce effective and sta-
ble politics.
Principled pluralism—having roots that Avigail Eisenberg (1995) has traced
to the beginning of the twentieth century—began to be reconstructed about
30 years ago as an alternative to orthodox (power-based) pluralism. Michael
Walzer (1983) argued that sheer applications of political power, nomatter how
dispersed, are tyrannical; to be legitimate, political decisions should be resolved
through the application of justice principles. But there are many reasonable
principles of justice, and there are many reasonable principles focusing on broad
political goals other than distributive justice (freedom, security, economic well-
being, etc.) that can be brought to bear on political issues.
Principled pluralism is a public philosophy that maintains that participants
in politics should bring whatever principles they hold to each concrete political
issue that a community faces. Each issue should then be resolved in a manner
that reflects those principles that are deemed through open and reasonable
deliberation to be most relevant to the issue and that are most broadly shared
in the political community (Schumaker 1991). Rather than reflecting the dis-
tribution of power brought to bear on behalf of various interests, political
outcomes should (and can) reflect the common and emerging moral and po-
litical understandings of most people in a polity. To be supported and con-
sidered legitimate, decisions should be justified as reflecting appropriate prin-
ciples that are accessible and acceptable to participants in decision-making and
to the broader public affected by these decisions. As concrete issues arise, the
challenge is to find the particular principles that accomplish this task.
Principles exist at various levels of abstraction, from the relatively “thick”
to the relatively “thin.” Ideologues strongly hold thick principles and apply
them broadly and dogmatically over a wide array of political issues. Thick ideo-
logical principles conceive political ideals in specific ways, as when the egali-
tarian left claims that justice requires that government distribute social goods
more equally (Rawls 1999b), and when the libertarian right claims that free
markets should distribute income andwealth unequally on the basis of fair pro-
cesses of acquisition and exchange (Nozick 1974). Those who hold thick prin-
ciples often disparage considerations that undermine their positions. These are
the sort of principles that are stressed by today’s ideological partisans and give
the impression of a hopelessly divided Congress and country.
In contrast, thin political principles are minimal and bland. People need no
ideology or deep philosophy to seek justice in the face of unfair treatment, the
public interest when special interests prevail, and democracy when oligarchs
dominate the political process. Who can be against justice, the public interest,
and democracy? Thin principles have universal appeal because they are so
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vague that they seem consistent with all partisan views, but their very vague-
ness makes them inoperable as principled reasons that can justify one policy
position over others.
The principles of pluralismare intermediate to such thick and thin principles.
They are not so thick as to be hostile to competing values and considerations.
They are not so thin as to be without meaning and practical guidance. Theymay
not be universal, but they comprise the moral, social, and political concerns of
most reasonable people within a political community.
Equal opportunity is a leading example of a pluralist justice principle that is
widely shared in America today. Even as there remain gaps between the norm
of equal opportunity and practices that depart from that norm, few reject the
general principle. Of course, equal opportunity can mean various things and re-
quire various remedies to such gaps, but broad acceptance of the basic principle
has facilitated passage of much equal rights legislation and led to far more equal
opportunity than existed a half century ago. Drawing on the terminology of
Rawls (1999b, 57–70), we might say that during the 1960s, a “natural” (or for-
mal) conception of equal opportunity stressed “careers open to talents” with-
out regard to race, ethnicity, gender, and so on. During the 1970s, a “liberal”
conception of equal opportunity stressed that justice also required providing
compensation for those with undeserved social disadvantages, such as being
raised in crime-infested neighborhoods having inferior schools. A “democratic”
interpretation of equal opportunity also emerged that sought to compensate
those with undeserved natural (or genetic) disadvantages. People holding com-
peting ideologies no doubt emphasize such alternative thicker conceptions of
equal opportunity, but their agreement on the thinner but still meaningful and
robust conception of equal opportunity has enabled high levels of consensus
on particular issues.When racial discrimination in employment, education, and
housing was at issue during the 1960s, those committed to liberal and demo-
cratic equal opportunity could be satisfied by policy decisions, such as the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, that sought (mere) formal equal opportunity.
When improving education for children with disabilities was at issue in the
1970s and 1980s, those with democratic conceptions of equal opportunity
could argue that such legislation as the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act of 1975 could extend and deepen commitments to equal opportunity.
In short, pluralist public philosophy seeks to maximize political agreement by
employing principles—like equal opportunity—that are intermediate in ab-
straction, more meaningful than vague values as policy guides, and shared by
those having ideological or partisan differences. Obama often invokes the idea
of equal opportunity, but he argues that the methods of enhancing such op-
portunity change with contextual conditions, that such new forces as global-
ization and the increasing concentration of wealth require us to rethink the
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ways that opportunities for all citizens can be extended. But Obama makes
clear that we should understand equal opportunity as something that is inad-
equately delivered by freemarkets: “we’ve depended on governmental action to
open up opportunity” (Obama 2006, 150).
The challenge for pluralists is to locate a comprehensive set of such prin-
ciples at a level of abstraction that is intermediate to the thick principles of
ideologues and bland thin principles. Such principles should reflect the com-
mon and emerging understandings of most people in a political community.
Such principles should be accessible to people having competing stronger but
reasonable principles drawn from competing ideologies and thus can be ac-
knowledged as being met even when their strong principles are not embodied
in particular political decisions.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls made a major contribution to principled
pluralism when he claimed that effective and stable politics in pluralist soci-
eties (where citizens have the autonomy to develop, revise, and pursue their
own conception of the good life) require “an overlapping consensus” on some
general, abstract, and relatively thin but still robust political ideas. He did not
specify the contents of this consensus in detail, but Rawls did claim, “Its
breadth goes beyond political principles instituting democratic procedures to
include principles covering the basic structure as a whole; hence its principles
also establish certain substantive rights such as liberty of conscience and free-
dom of thought, as well as fair equal opportunity and principles covering
certain essential needs” (2005, 164).
The new generation of pluralist political theorists has been less interested in
clarifying and elaborating the contents of Rawls’s overlapping consensus than
in the important matters of including previously excluded voices in political
deliberations and employing public reason (Schlosberg 2006). Still, there has
been some work addressing the contents of Rawls’s overlapping consensus.
To describe a “liberal consensus”—a term used to refer to cultural beliefs in
a liberal pluralist society rather than to indicate the predominant views of
liberal partisans—George Klosko (2000, vii) suggests that Rawls was insuf-
ficiently attentive to empirical research about the actual beliefs of the Amer-
ican public. Drawing from public opinion surveys and the conclusions drawn
from research on such data by (mostly) political scientists, Klosko argues
that Rawls failed to recognize the extensive intolerance, denial of important
rights, resistance to social justice, and preference for market justice that exist
among the American public.4 According to Klosko, the most important con-
4. Klosko points out that in a pluralist society, consensus does not require unanimity, as
there will always be those who hold views that most citizens regard as extreme and perhaps
“unreasonable” (2000, 42–80). There will also be those whose general acceptance of plural-
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sensus in American politics is narrow and focuses on democratic procedures
(146–49).5
Recently, Rex Martin (2014, 288–91) has argued that the primary role of
the overlapping consensus is to provide a broad framework for public political
justification. Two such roles can be differentiated.
First, the contents of the overlapping consensus can and should be used to
justify specific practices, policies, and programs. What a political regime does
should be justified by the principles contained within the overlapping con-
sensus. To the extent that such justifications are provided by the officials of the
regime and accepted by most citizens, the ideals of deliberative democracy are
approached (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 3–7).
Second, perhaps the contents of the overlapping consensus should be jus-
tified. But the problem here is that Rawls suggested that there are no ethical
justifications for it (other than the thin liberal beliefs that society ought to be
a cooperative arrangement and each person in it should be provided equal
respect). Thus, nonphilosophical methods must be developed to identify its
contents. One method is “convergence”: the contents of the irreconcilable rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrines held within the society can be examined to
locate any ideas on which there is overlap or commonality among the otherwise
competing doctrines. This is the method recommended by Klosko (2000, 186–
207), and Rawls’s early presentations of the overlapping doctrine can be read as
supporting this method, which would clearly lead to its contents being highly
restricted. Martin suggests that this method is mistaken: the basis of the over-
lapping consensus is “not so much that various comprehensive doctrines (un-
derstood as ‘isms’) converge . . . ; rather it is that the considerable bulk of citizens,
ist ideas is trumped by their partisan views, moral convictions, and fears about particular
applications of pluralist ideals. When trying to discern broad acceptance of principles from
the results of survey research, some researchers have used 75% support for a principle as
sufficient to be regarded as “consensual,” but various ways of framing survey questions can
influence responses in ways that preclude any hard-and-fast rules for inferring public con-
sensus from particular polls. Given such problems, I do not report polling data in this article.
Nevertheless, most polls indicate wide (though hardly unanimous) support for the principles I
suggest as being part of pluralist public philosophy.
5. Klosko’s work is a major contribution, but three limitations can be suggested. Perhaps
he overemphasizes existing attitudes as revealed in empirical research, as the overlapping
consensus can be regarded as a normative conception that articulates the beliefs that could be
and ought to be accepted to achieve stability in a pluralist society. Perhaps Klosko’s list of
consensual principles is too narrow, as there may be other types of principles than those
dealing with political rights, democratic procedures, and just distributions that can be im-
portant to combating increasing polarization and achieving stability. And perhaps Klosko
(like Rawls) is insufficiently attentive to the possibility that the American consensus includes
philosophical assumptions that are widely embraced, or at least not much challenged, in
American society.
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coming from diverse perspectives, do” (2014, 289). Martin points out that Rawls
always sought to find consensual ideas in “the fundamental ideas we seem to
share through the public political culture” (Rawls 2005, 150).
The term overlapping consensus would seem to imply the convergence
method, but if the better method of determining the contents of our consensus
is to examine the political culture and identify widely accepted public norms,
the term underlying consensus, which has long been used and sought by plu-
ralists, seems better to capture this approach. Politicians with pluralist sensi-
bilities, like Obama, use this approach when they appeal to common moral
and political understandings that most people could and would accept upon
due reflection, even if they sometimes express political ideas that are inconsis-
tent with these underling norms. To the extent that the public becomes more
aware of these norms and supports politicians and policies consistent with
these norms, the contents of the underlying consensus become expanded and
easier to identify by scholars committed to the development of principled plu-
ralism. Rawls (2005, 462–66) ultimately supported such “a wide view of pub-
lic political culture” as the method needed to conceive the contents of the con-
sensual ideals of liberal societies like America.
Martha Nussbaum (2011, 89–93) has also interpreted Rawls’s overlapping
consensus. She suggests that her “capabilities approach” aspires to be a cos-
mopolitan version of Rawls’s nation-based overlapping consensus, or at least
those elements of that consensus that deal with citizen and human rights.6 But
perhaps her most important insight is that Rawls did not envision the over-
lapping consensus as a fixed set of widely held ideas, because widespread sup-
port for what ought to be consensual principles may not yet be present. Ac-
cording to Nussbaum, Rawls only requires that there be “a plausible path” to
broad endorsement of the principles that are part of the overlapping consen-
sus (90–91).
Although the open, evolving, contextual, and tentative nature of consensual
values in a pluralist society precludes any definitive specification of Rawls’s
overlapping (or pluralism’s underlying) consensus, this article is concerned
with providing an account of it that is both broader than has thus far been
attempted and sensitive to the subsequent analyses of it by Klosko, Martin,
and Nussbaum.
6. In contrast to Nussbaum, Rawls (1999a) hesitated to regard the consensual ideas of a
liberal pluralist society as having global applicability. While Rawls thought that the contents
of the overlapping consensus applied to liberal nations, my concern is only with the consensus
within contemporary American society. Thus, the contents of principled pluralism should be
regarded as less broadly applicable than that sought by Rawls, and far less broadly applicable
than the global consensus sought by Nussbaum.
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2. THE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF PLURALISM
2.1. TOLERANCE
Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus can be interpreted as an extension of
the liberal principle of political toleration (Klosko 2000, 6). Historically, lib-
erals have argued that political stability requires religious toleration (of dif-
ferent beliefs about the sacred and divine, as argued by John Locke), moral
acceptance (of different beliefs about the good life, as argued by John Stuart
Mill), and philosophical broad-mindedness (about different priorities among
values, as suggested byWilliam James). Rawls, likemany liberals and pluralists
before him, stressed that a well-ordered and stable society requires its members
to “put up with” people whose religious, moral, and philosophical views differ
from their own; they adopt a “live and let live” attitude toward others, at least
as long as others are reasonable and don’t undermine social stability (Klosko
2000, 20, 43). While Rawls gave little attention to tolerating partisan political
differences (or racial, ethnic, or sexual differences), other liberals and pluralists
have emphasized these forms of toleration, and there is little doubt that Rawls
shared such concerns.
Obama has often given voice to such tolerance, such as in his chapters in
Audacity on faith and race. But there is another conception of tolerance where
Obama has been more pluralistic than some liberals. In his initial presentation
of Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasized that in public life people should
adopt “public reason.” They should refrain from bringing arguments from
various comprehensive doctrines into political deliberations; by doing so, they
fulfill their political (if not their legal) duty to make their arguments accessible
to others who do not share their comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 2005, 216–
18). Such a liberalism is intolerant of justifications brought to bear on political
issues that are rooted in particular comprehensive doctrines. While liberals
may put up with people making such arguments, such views should not be
accepted or included in the reasons used to justify decisions to the public. Such
justifications do not treat with equal respect those not subscribing to them.
In his “Call for Renewal” address given on June 28, 2006, Obama spoke of
a pluralist conception of tolerance that is more receptive to employing argu-
ments drawn from comprehensive doctrines and that reflects Rawls’s more
inclusive notion of political reason as developed in subsequent editions of Po-
litical Liberalism. Beyond adopting liberal and pluralist ideals about not “im-
posing our beliefs on one another” and not disrespecting religious values,
Obama (2006, 212–19) proclaimed that “ignoring religion deprives liberals
from effectively addressing issues in moral terms,” that “secularists are wrong
when they ask believers to leave their religion at the door before entering into
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the public square,” and that “to say that men and women should not inject
their ‘personal’ morality into public policy debates is a practical absurdity.”
Obama’s toleration of incorporating into public discourse ideas drawn from
various comprehensive doctrines, as long as they are “subject to argument
and amendable to reason,” expresses a wider conception of toleration that is
central both to democratic principles and to the practices of American politi-
cal culture than is liberal suppression of justifications that do not meet the
strictures of public reason as expressed initially by Rawls. Such toleration by
Obama is also consistent with the views of those political theorists who reject a
“hegemonic mode of discourse” that limits political arguments to those con-
sistent with a narrow conception of “public reason” (Wolin 1996, 102).
2.2. RIGHTS
Rawls emphasized that citizens must be guaranteed extensive equal rights,
including freedom of thought and conscience, security against violations of
their lives and personal property, due process in the legal system, and freedom
of political participation and opposition. Such rights sometimes conflict, and
thus some provisions for limiting even basic rights are required (Sniderman
et al. 1996), though such limitations have to be equally applied to all. When
such conflicts arise, partisans normally take opposing positions on which rights
should be limited and which should be extended.
Obama has taken a liberal position on limiting gun rights, drawing on
pluralist sensibilities that unlimited access to guns threatens other rights such
as protection of lives. Obama has remarked that he believes that “the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms. But to better protect
our children and our communities from tragic mass shootings . . . there are
common-sense steps we can take right now.”7 Still, the very modest policies
and proposals he has supported in this area indicate his pluralist orientations
and unwillingness to push too hard against the perceived legitimacy of the gun
culture that is so prevalent in America, as well as partisan resistance to his
proposed restrictions.
One option for dealing with moral differences on particular rights is to take
a partisan position and try to offer convincing justifications that make that
position more consensual. Obama has backed a liberal position about LGBTQ
rights. Although he awaited a greater public consensus before doing so, his
subsequent endorsement of gay marriage is consistent with the ideals of both
liberals and pluralists that rights must be equally available to all. Obama’s
7. This quote can be found at www.whitehouse.gov/issues/preventing-gun-violence.
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voice arguably contributed to the rapid changes occurring in American cul-
ture on the issue of gay rights, changes that the Supreme Court could not ig-
nore when it upheld the right to gay marriage in its landmark ruling in Ober-
gefell v. Hodges on June 26, 2015.
A second option for dealing with partisan and moral differences is to avoid
issues where there are obvious conflicts among basic rights. While Obama
voted for a religious freedom restoration act while serving in the Illinois Senate
in 1998, that bill was thought to protect religious rights against governmental
interference, and its conflict with other basic rights was not yet apparent.
However, when Indiana moved similar legislation in March 2015, the conflict
between religious rights and gay rights was clear. Probably out of a pluralist
orientation to minimize conflict, Obama has yet to speak on the matter—
instead leaving it to White House aides to argue that the religious rights pro-
vided by such legislation should not extend to the right to discriminate against
LGBTQs. But, of course, such issue avoidance can be seen as mere timidity, an
example of vulgar pluralism.
A third and better pluralist approach for dealing with conflicting rights is to
seek policies that recognize the importance of each but draw acceptable limits
on them. This approach by Obama is illustrated on the issue of privacy rights
and security rights in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations about the
surveillance activities of the National Security Agency (NSA). Regardless of
ideology, most Americans want both protection of their privacy and security
from terrorism. In this case, Obama has called for more protection of privacy
while acknowledging that the intelligence-gathering activities of the NSA
should not be overly constrained.8 Trying to find a consensus on the balance
between conflicting privacy and security rights that most people will accept
illustrates Obama’s principled pluralism on this issue.
2.3. CONSTITUTIONALISM
For Rawls (2005, 227–30), “constitutional essentials” deal with fundamental
principles about governmental structures (like the separation of powers), the
scope of majority rule, and the protections of the rule of law. In Martin’s
(2014, 284–85) interpretation of Rawls, the constitutional consensus does not
require agreement on the particulars of the American Constitution, but rather
evolving broad agreements regarding rights, practices, and procedures.Obama
incorporated such understandings when he wrote appreciatively of “Our Con-
8. See “Liberty and Security in a Changing World,” at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf.
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stitution”—not necessarily in its particulars or as interpreted by “Constitutional
fundamentalists,” “strict constructivists,” or “originalists,” but rather as pro-
viding “elaborate machinery . . . designed to force us into a conversation, a
‘deliberative democracy’ in which all citizens are required to engage in a process
of testing their ideas against an external reality, persuading others of their point
of view, and building shifting alliances of consent” (2006, 92). Obama reads
the Constitution as forcing upon Americans the processes of pluralist democ-
racy, where diverse groups must take into account the interests and principles
of others and where “we must test out our ideals, vision, and values against
the realities of common life, so that over time theymay be refined, discarded, or
replaced by new ideals, sharper visions, deeper values” (94–95).
For Obama, constitutionalism goes beyond what is provided in the original
Constitution and various amendments to it. Much of his discussion on con-
stitutionalism inAudacity is concerned with the practice of filibusters, which is
not a part of the Constitution. He objected to Republican threats in 2005 to
employ “the nuclear option” of ending 200 years of Senate practices regarding
the use of filibusters and the rules of debate, as “changing the rules in the
middle of the game” (Obama 2006, 82). Thus, it may seem unprincipled that
when changing balances of power in the Senate prompted Democrats to re-
duce the use of the filibusters in October 2013, Obama supported these changes
in the rules. However, Obama can claim that he was acting within Rawls’s
understanding of constitutional consensus: “once settled it is vital that the
structure (and procedures) of government be changed only as experience shows
it to be required by political justice or the common good, and not be prompted
by the political advantage of one party or group that at the moment has the
upper hand” (Rawls 2005, 228). Obama supported only limited changes in
rules regarding the filibuster. His claim was that effective governance was
thwartedwhen senatorial Republicans usedor threatened to use thefilibuster to
delay appointments of well-qualified administrators of congressionally au-
thorized programs and of lower-level judges needed to fill court vacancies and
deliver timely legal justice. It was these threats to “justice and the common
good” that justified limited rule changes. Obama did not seek to limit the use of
filibusters in the areas of appointments to the Supreme Court or in the passage
of major legislation.
2.4. BASIC SOCIAL STRUCTURES
While Rawls, Klosko, and Martin all stress the importance of consensus on
questions of “the basic social structures” of a pluralist society, their writings
are less than clear about what these structures ought to be and how important
each structure should be in organizing the activities of the citizens within
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America’s various polities. Perhaps the following principles about structures
can be regarded as being, or potentially being, part of the pluralist consensus.
First, economicmarkets, governments, voluntary associations, families, and
cultural values are all important structures for organizing and coordinating
the activities of citizens in community life. Second, the roles of each of these
structures must be limited and balanced to avoid capitalist, governmental, theo-
cratic, cultural, and other forms of domination; having countervailing struc-
tures is an important American principle. Third, governments are nevertheless
the sovereign structures of American society (Walzer 1983, 281–84). While
their powers must be limited, governments are the final court of appeals in
resolving community conflicts, because—unlike economic actors, voluntary
associations, families, and cultural norms—democratic governments have been
authorized by constitutions to make certain rulings and because governmental
officials have been empowered by (federal and state) constitutions and demo-
cratic processes to be the ultimate “referees” or “umpires” that resolve com-
munity issues.
During the past several decades, conservatives have stressed that the federal
government has assumed too large a role in American society and have thus
sought to limit its role and enhance those of free markets, churches, families,
and traditional cultural values. Liberal Democrats have sought to reverse
conservative advances in these areas and rebalance American social structures
in ways that reflect their partisan principles that stronger governmental au-
thority is needed to curtail various corporate abuses of power, that domestic
violence must be subject to police intervention, that traditional culture values
must be balanced with greater appreciation of multiculturalism, and that la-
bor unions need to regain a greater role in civil society. Obama has supported
many liberal initiatives in these areas, but he has always done so in ways con-
sistent with the pluralist structural principles listed here. For example, Obama
supported the creation of a new consumer protection agency and imposing
greater restrictions on proprietary banking—but these restrictions were too
narrowly framed to be regarded as radical structural changes in the political
economy.9 Nothing in either Obama’s rhetoric or his policy proposals suggests
that he seeks to diminish significantly the role of economic markets and capi-
talist practices in structuring America.
Obama has supported legislation to strengthen those associations in civil
society that have tended to support liberal ideals (especially labor unions), but
he has avoided any initiatives that might undermine those (religious and
commercial) associations that support conservative causes. He has also given
9. See Obama’s remarks at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing
-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act.
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voice tomulticultural valueswhile simultaneously supportingmany traditional
values, such as the “conservative notion of self-help.”10 As these examples
suggest, Obama’s structural principles are pluralistic; rather than diminish-
ing the role of any social structures or any (reasonable) cultural values, he has
sought to affirm the importance of them all. Any structures that embed Amer-
icans more deeply into community life are useful correctives to the overly in-
dividualistic, indeed liberal, tendencies in American culture. Given the impor-
tance of individualism within American culture, such a stance may seem to be
at odds with American consensual beliefs. But as Walzer (1990) reminds us,
Americans have often pursued more communitarian principles in response to
the excesses of liberal individualism, and as Eisenberg (1995) points out, plu-
ralism has the capacity to reconcile liberal and communitarian ideals. Obama
can be seen as merely seeking communitarian corrections to American soci-
ety by strengthening its public and social structures in ways that remind the
American people that “we are all in this together.”
2.5. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls defended egalitarian and redistributive principles
of justice (1999b, 53).However, philosophical objections from libertarians and
widespread public support for market-based distributions that reflect differ-
ences in merit and contributions may be among the reasons that Rawls backed
away from a strong interpretation of these principles. “Though a social mini-
mum providing for the basic needs of all citizens is also an essential, what I
have called the ‘difference principle’ is more demanding and is not” (Rawls
2005, 228–29). Pluralism provides principles of justice that can clarify Rawls
evolving views, and Obama has supported these principles.
Pluralists endorse market justice: people should reap unequal rewards for
their unequal merit and contributions within a free-market economy having
rules that are fair and equally applicable to all. Pluralists also endorse social
justice. This means initially that all people should have equal access to some
public goods and services, such as public schools. Additionally, it recognizes
that people have diverse disadvantages that cannot be overcome by providing
equal services or equal minimal incomes for all. Accordingly, Rawls’s prin-
ciple calling for “social minimums” cannot be understood as seeking to provide
all citizens with similar welfare checks. As emphasized by Nussbaum’s capa-
bilities approach, public assistance must come in many unequal forms that are
10. See Obama’s speech “A More Perfect Union,” given in Philadelphia on March 18,
2008, at http://obamaspeeches.com/E05-Barack-Obama-A-More-Perfect-Union-the-Race
-Speech-Philadelphia-PA-March-18-2008.htm.
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sensitive to the particular needs of those who are disadvantaged in various
ways.Whether various public provisions are equal or unequal, social justice re-
lieves recipients from paying market prices for these goods; taxes and other
governmental revenues cover the costs. Pluralists understand the tensions be-
tween market and social justice and believe that these tensions are generally
resolved in practice by adopting policies that enhance fair equal opportunity
and that increase the progressivity of taxes.
After several decades of retrenchment of the welfare state by Republicans,
who view poverty as largely an individual problem arising from personal fail-
ures, Obama was widely regarded during his first campaign for the presidency
as a supporter of social justice, who would increase governmental programs to
aid the disadvantaged. As president, he has expressed his liberal belief thatmany
afflictions limiting the opportunities of the disadvantaged are not of their own
makingbut arise fromcircumstances overwhich they have little control,11 andhe
believes that the American public, especially the rich, should provide greater
public assistance to those in need. Such orientations can be seen in several of
Obama’s initiatives as president—most famously in those elements of the Af-
fordable Care Act, upheld by the Supreme Court on June 24, 2015, in King v.
Burwell, that provide public subsidies (of varying amounts) for those unable to
afford health insurance.
There is extensive evidence that inequalities in income and wealth are in-
creasing. In the most well-known recent work on this topic, Thomas Piketty
(2014) emphasizes that these are not due simply to unequal contributions in
the market or a reflection of merit as assessed by the quantity or quality of
labor that individuals contribute to the production and availability of social
goods. Piketty claims that increasing concentrations of wealth result from
normal economic processes that provide returns on wealth that are greater
than the rate of economic growth. The biggest gains in income and wealth in
the United States in the past four decades have been received by corporate
managers and those in the financial sector whose contributions and merit are
difficult to measure, but who have benefitted from changing corporate pro-
cesses and governmental regulations (330–33). The concentrations of wealth
generated by such economic and political forces increasingly make inherited
wealth a key component of income, which challenges the notion that eco-
nomic inequalities are due to contribution and merit. Such concentrations of
economic resources undermine the consensual ideal of real equal opportunity.
Those with inherited wealth have far more opportunities than others to ac-
11. For a good illustration of such views by Obama, see his remarks on Trayvon Martin,
at www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHBdZWbncXI (July 19, 2013).
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quire those human and material resources that are the keys to economic suc-
cess in the marketplace.
On several occasions Obama has bemoaned America’s widening inequalities
in incomeandwealth,12 but he has yet to comeupwith an extensive set of policy
initiatives to address the matter. For Obama, addressing inequality seems to
involve the related goals of reducing unemployment and poverty, increasing
opportunities for the poor (especially children raised in poverty), and having
more governmental spending in such areas as early childhood and junior col-
lege education that are available to people having various disadvantages rather
than to only those who can afford them. If these, rather than redistribution of
income and wealth from the rich to the poor, are his real social justice goals,
Obama is less the egalitarian liberal than a pluralist, having principles that
are widely shared. As a pluralist, Obama seems more interested in providing
“floors” (various forms of public assistance to support the poor and middle
class) than establishing“ceilings” (that take away from the rich their capacity to
acquire wealth and to bequeath it to their children).
Reducing inequality would require much more progressive taxes. Accord-
ing to Piketty, “the progressive tax is a relatively liberal method for reduc-
ing inequality, in the sense that free competition and private property are
respected. . . . The progressive tax thus represents an ideal compromise be-
tween social justice and individual freedom” (2014, 505).
On January 2, 2013, Obama signed a budget deal that added some pro-
gressivity to the tax code, raising from 35% to 39.6% the income tax rate on
those earning over $388,500 annually. Such an increase was less than that
sought by liberals, and it fell short of Obama’s call for following “the Buffet
rule . . . asking a billionaire to pay at least as much (percentage-wise) as his
secretary in taxes.”13 Perhaps he still hopes to increase the progressivity of the
American tax code, but his pluralist perspective surely informs him that
seeking such reforms must be tempered by the need to compromise with more
conservative members of Congress.
3. OBAMA ’S PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Underlying the sorts of political principles discussed above are various phil-
osophical assumptions. Philosophical assumptions involve ontological, so-
ciological, anthropological, and epistemological ideas that are beyond inter-
12. See “Remarks by the President on the Economy,” delivered on December 6, 2011, at
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/remarks-president-economy-owawatomie
-kansas.
13. See Obama’s State of the Union address delivered on January 24, 2012, at www
.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2012.
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subjective verification. The universe, societies, humanity, and knowledge have
many dimensions that make their characterization extraordinarily complex,
but partisans typically assume that specific aspects of these foundations of
political principles are especially important. God is at the center of the uni-
verse for religious fundamentalists. Societies are divided by class for Marxists.
Humans are self-interested for classical liberals. Tradition provides the basis
for political knowledge for cultural conservatives.
Pluralists avoid assumptions about the essences of things that are often the
subjects of philosophical and ideological debate. Ask Americans with pluralist
sensibilities to choose among a variety of religious, moral, and ideological as-
sumptions about the nature of the universe, society, humanity, or knowledge,
and they will normally reply that many of these ideas have some merit. This
may reflect a lack of depth in American thinking, but perhaps it also represents
what is most admirable about American political thought. Richard Rorty
(1998, 15–38) has argued that what is inspiring in America is our refusal to
constrain our politics by getting bogged down in metaphysical concepts and
choices. Unlike Europeans, Americans do not seek a culture built on particu-
lar philosophical assumptions or ideational strands. Rather, we pursue a new
and better culture that “will be a tapestry in which more strands have been
woven together” (25). Obama provided similar imagery when he claimed in
his first inaugural address that “our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a
weakness.”
This American attitude about de-emphasizing and indeed avoiding narrow
philosophical assumptions is at the core of Rawls’s project, in which he pro-
posed not only doing away with thick or strong philosophical assumptions
but also avoiding all philosophical assumptions. But in this he may have gone
further than what is required for consensus in a diverse society. If the purpose
of consensual ideals is to provide the bases for public political justification,
then a large variety of philosophical assumptions drawn from many compre-
hensive doctrines might be assessable to most citizens and acceptable to many.
Convergence on strong philosophical assumptions seems impossible. But
perhaps philosophical assumptions can be framed more thinly, at an inter-
mediate level of abstraction that can be widely understood and command the
respect of people committed to competing comprehensive doctrines. Obama
has articulated or at least implied such philosophical assumptions.
3.1. ONTOLOGY
The most basic and perhaps least controversial assumption of pluralism is that
we live in William James’s “pluriverse”—a world of multiple and competing
values (Ferguson 2007). Both Rawls and Obama (2006, 43–69) have em-
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phasized this assumption and have claimed that no single value is an absolute
or supreme. Political life consists of choosing which values to pursue and set-
ting priorities among them. This leads immediately to a second pluralist on-
tological assumption: that what happens here on earth or in America depends
on our individual and collective choices about which values we wish to pur-
sue. A third pluralist ontological assumption is that there is a certain attrac-
tiveness and plausibility in the ontological assumptions that are central to
competing comprehensive doctrines. Such assumptions cannot be dismissed
out of hand, but they should be given weaker interpretations than religions,
moral philosophies, and political ideologies often assert (White 2000).
When those holding religious doctrines proclaim that God is ultimate re-
ality and the ultimate force of what happens on earth, pluralists need not reject
God’s existence, but they can claim that the Divine Will does not completely
determine what happens on earth. Pluralists can accept and applaud those
who seek God but can point out that not everyone has found Him. Pluralists
can accept weak ontological assumptions about God’s existence and moral
attractions (Rawls 2009), but they think that strong assumptions that we must
obey God’s Will are to be resisted both because God’s Will is mysterious and
because claims to know God’s Will are too authoritarian to be acceptable as
the basis of a pluralist democracy.
Populists claim that it is not God’sWill that must be reflected in our political
choices but the will of the people. Pluralists reject this strong ontological as-
sumption for the same reasons they reject strong assumptions about God: the
will of the people is often mysterious, and those who proclaim to know it often
become authoritarians who quell dissent (Riker 1982, 238–49). Still, populist
assumptions have some attractions in a democratic society, and a thinner
version of populist assumptions can be accepted: public preferences must be
respected, and political decisions should ordinarily not engender widespread
public opposition.
Neoliberals and libertarians have often claimed that our policies must con-
form to the natural laws of economics: economic growth and prosperity, as
measured by aggregate national income or wealth, are the keys to the realiza-
tion of a broad array of values, and certain economic policies must inevitably
and invariably be implemented to ensure prosperity (Steger 2009, 68–75).
Pluralists reject such strong ontological assumptions, both because the laws of
economic growth are disputed and because we can choose to pursue other
political values (like economic equality and ecological sustainability) even if
that means lesser economic growth.
Liberals have somewhat thicker ontological views than pluralists, as they
assume that history will be progressive. Like Hegel, liberals believe that de-
ficient ideals will be replaced by better ones, and that the accumulation of
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knowledge and moral understandings means that decay in the quality of life
reflects merely temporary misguided applications of evolving ideals, but the
most important and valid ideas can never be lost. Thus, as Francis Fukuyama
(1992) has argued, the fundamental values of liberalism (individualism, free-
dom, equality, security, opportunity, and prosperity) and the basic social struc-
tures of liberalism (democracy and capitalism) are the ultimate political guides
for the good life for all humans. Any misguided political actions that curtail
the realization of these ideals will be detected by evolving human intelligence,
and corrections will be made that reestablish progress toward the universal
realization of liberal goals.
Pluralists are not so sure of these liberal assumptions. First, they believe
that the values that liberals pursue can be too narrow, as pluralists can also
appreciate socialist longings for more social solidarity and conservative long-
ings for more respect for authority. Second, pluralists recognize that some
people and cultures reject the values of liberalism (or other partisan perspec-
tives that accept pluralist constraints). Pluralists think that it is possible that
history could again be shaped by ontological assumptions that they find flawed
as political guides, as political communities could submit to some fundamen-
talist articulation of God’s or Allah’s Will, to populist claims that the will of the
majority must prevail, to some Marxist conception that economic forces will
inevitably lead to an ideal communist society, or to the (neoliberal) globalist
claim that “there is no alternative” but to submit to the laws of capitalist eco-
nomics. Pluralists may seek to realize liberal values, but they are unlikely to as-
sume that progress toward liberal ideals is inevitable; rather, they will see such
progress as contingent. It can only be hoped for and pursued energetically.
When put this way, it seems clear that Obama is more the pluralist than the
liberal. His writings, speeches, and policy initiatives all exhibit an optimism
that progress toward the fuller realization of liberal values is possible, but many
obstacles—including our fears, cynicism, and hypocrisy—must be overcome
(Obama 2006, 43–69).
3.2. SOCIOLOGY
Pluralists accept similar weak assumptions about the nature of society. First,
they doubt that all societies share some essential characteristics, instead be-
lieving that existing societal characteristics are contextual. Second, they reject
the ideas that societies must be homogeneous or that the individuals and groups
that are part of society must be made subordinate to the collectivity. Third, they
believe that all societies are composed of diverse individuals and groups having
a mix of common and competing interests and values. Fourth, they will see
some merit in various assumptions about how societies can be composed in
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order to coordinate the activities of diverse individuals and groups in a fair and
effective manner.
Pluralists will thus be receptive to various assumptions about the nature of
society. They can see merit in traditional views that societies are like or-
chestras, in that their various sections need effective leaders to conduct them
and produce social harmony. They can see merit in the libertarian view that
societies are marketplaces, where individuals are free to pursue their own
interests, as long as the rules of the marketplace are fair. They can see merit in
liberal conceptions that societies are held together by various social contracts.
Pluralists reject the Marxist assumption that societies are essentially class
divided and instead will accept the more liberal and pluralist view that societies
often contain a variety of social divisions defined by class, race, gender, and
so forth. However, liberals seem somewhat more judgmental than pluralists
about the “good guys” and the “bad guys” along these lines of cleavage. To the
thinner assumption of pluralists that society has many social divisions, con-
temporary liberals tend to make thicker assumptions that one side of these
divisions dominates, oppresses, exploits, and marginalizes the other. While
there is little in the scholarly writings of liberalism to justify such judgments,
liberal politicians, activists, and commentators in America—drawing from
more radical left traditions—often claim that minorities are dominated by
white majorities, that the poor are oppressed by the rich, that Wall Street is
favored over Main Street, and so forth. The pluralist recognizes these social
divisions but holds open the question whether the observed inequalities are
justified. Pluralists are wary of the tendency of the left to stigmatize the suc-
cessful, to invoke public sentiments against them for political gain.
While Obama has been willing to declare some practices as corrupt and to
insist on measures to help the exploited and dominated, he has been reluctant
to make grand generalizations criticizing such liberal enemies as “Wall Street,”
“corporate America,” “big pharmacy,” and that old standby “the military–
industrial complex.” For Obama, there are many actors in these sectors of
society that are doing important tasks for the polity; their legitimate interests
and ideals must be understood, and their real contributions must be acknowl-
edged. As Obama pointed out in his “Remarks on Economic Mobility” on
December 4, 2013, “We admire folks who start new businesses, create jobs,
and invent products that enrich our lives. And we expect them to be rewarded
handsomely for it.”14
This pluralist emphasis on social differences, rather than a more left-wing
emphasis on denigrating those atop various social hierarchies, has been par-
14. See “Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility,” delivered on December 4, 2013,
at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility.
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ticularly evident in Obama’s assumptions about race. Despite his advocacy for
African Americans, Obama has downplayed racial grievances that demand
white sacrifices and has avoided angry condemnations of white discrimination
and indifference to the restricted opportunities of blacks, as asserted by such
old-style civil rights leaders as Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton. He chastised his
own minister, Jeremiah Wright, for having “a profoundly distorted view of
this country—a view that sees racism as endemic”—and for speaking “as if
our country was static, as if no progress had been made.”15
3.3. ANTHROPOLOGY
Turning to assumptions about human nature, perhaps the most basic pluralist
idea is that people are basically equal and deserve equal respect, as Rawls has
emphasized throughout his work and Obama has expressed throughout his
presidency.
Pluralists also assume that people are neither inherently good nor evil. Or
perhaps a better articulation of this claim is to accept the contention of Rein-
holdNiebuhr (1944, 10) that humans are both “children of darkness (who) are
evil because they know no law beyond the self” and “children of light” who
“seek to bring self-interest under the discipline of a more universal law and in
harmony with a more universal good.” In an interview with David Brooks,
Obama declared his admiration for Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism
(Siemers 2009, xi). Because liberals stress human goodness, theymay forget the
need for vigilance against the dark side that resides in each of us. This wariness
of human limitations prompts Obama to be more cautious than his liberal
friends would like. Left to their own inclinations, liberals may overreach in
pursuing peace agreements with people who are more evil than liberals as-
sume. While conservative “realists” often accuse Obama of naïve liberal be-
liefs, Obama’s various foreign policy initiatives can be viewed as balancing or
vacillating between seeing the goodness and evil in others. For Obama, lib-
eral ideals about human nature justify efforts to try to reach out to those whom
conservatives regard as evil, but his broader pluralist outlook makes him
skeptical that others can be completely trusted.
Such recognition of diversity within and across people leads pluralists to
find understandable and plausible a variety of strong assumptions provided by
those committed to various comprehensive doctrines. For example, they rec-
ognize and indeed admire Rawls’s claim in A Theory of Justice that having
moral autonomy (the capacity to choose one’s own life plan and moral prin-
ciples) is a core motivation for people (1999b, 110). But pluralists also rec-
15. See “A More Perfect Union.”
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ognize and admire the idea that people can be primarily motivated to be em-
bedded in communities having religious and moral codes to which they are
bound. Indeed, Political Liberalism can be viewed as Rawls’s effort to ac-
commodate the belief that many people in pluralist society have such moti-
vations (Kymlicka 2002, 228–44). Obama has drawn on both the desire of
humans for autonomy and their desire for social roots in justifying various
policies. One of the virtues of Obamacare, Obama insists, is that it allows in-
dividuals many choices about health insurance and health care. One of the
virtues of belonging to a church is that religion can strengthen morality and
inculcate in people a greater sense of social purpose (Obama 2006, 214).
3.4. EPISTEMOLOGY
American pluralists also have weak but robust assumptions about the existence
of “truth” in political life and how we can best approach political knowledge.
Rorty (1998, 17) provides a forceful statement of the most basic epistemo-
logical belief of American pluralists: “a refusal to believe in the existence of
Truth, in the sense of something not made by human hands, something that
has authority over human beings.” Americans “will take nothing as authori-
tative save free consensus between as diverse a variety of citizens as can pos-
sibly be produced” (30). This means that pluralists will not simply accept as
truth the proclamations made by any kind of authorities, their interpretations
of such “sacred” texts as the Bible and the Constitution, or the arguments pro-
vided in such canonical works as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations or Rawls’s
A Theory of Justice.16
But in search of as much consensus on political truths as possible, in search
of objectivity understood as intersubjective agreement among citizens, pluralists
draw on various epistemologies. They may employ intuitions, proclaiming as
conservatives do that there is within all people some common moral intuitions
on which we can draw (Haidt 2012). They may employ the sort of deductive
reasoning that has been used by liberals to seek agreement on the contents of
various social contracts. Pluralists will also use a wide array of scientific meth-
ods to collect facts and generalize from them. Natural scientists accumulate
evidence about such processes as global warming to get people to understand
what Al Gore called “an inconvenient truth.” Social scientists accumulate evi-
16. As Klosko (2000, 105–15) suggests, perhaps the greatest difficulty for pluralism is not
its ability to accommodate fundamentalists, but that fundamentalists may be unwilling to
accept pluralism. Fundamentalists (religious or otherwise) have had cognitive styles that resist
any other source of justification than their own faith. But pluralists can take comfort in
research showing that increasing encounters between fundamentalists and the rest of society
have reduced such narrow-mindedness (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 541–50).
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dence about such economic, social, and political processes as capitalism’s ten-
dencies to lead to the concentration of wealth (Piketty 2014). While natural
science and social science are often committed to positivist epistemologies that
simply describe and explain our world, other scientific methods may be em-
ployed that add values to facts when making knowledge claims. Pluralists are
open to and indeed seek utilitarian claims that the good consequences of a pol-
icy outweigh the bad for most effected people. Knowing through scientific in-
vestigation the consequences of policy alternatives can help greatly in reaching
consensual moral judgments about which option is “for the greater good.”An-
other scientific epistemology that pluralists use—indeed emphasize—is prag-
matism.
It is widely regarded that Obama is a pragmatist, indeed, that his prag-
matism leads him to compromise his liberal principles (see, e.g., Kloppenberg
2011). The problem with such a diagnosis is that no epistemology is more
central to liberalism than pragmatism. Contemporary liberalism emerged out
of an older classical liberalism when liberals recognized the limitations of
logical deductions, utilitarianism, and intuitionism, as providing firm access
to political truths. During the twentieth century, liberals became pragmatic in
two senses. First, they recognized that there is no absolute truth about the
good life, the good society, and good government to be pursued, but only com-
pelling problems to be surmounted. Philosophical pragmatism has provided
an experimental approach to achieving knowledge about effective means to
combat totalitarian enemies on the world stage, to lift the economy out of de-
pressions and recessions, to address discriminatory practices, and so forth.
Second, liberals recognized that policy experiments on behalf of these quests
would always be resisted, given the diverse views of powerful actors within
modern pluralist societies; thus, putting together a coalition having sufficient
power resources to undertake social experiments requires accommodating di-
verse interests. By recognizing such needs, Obama has been a liberal and phil-
osophical pragmatist. But his epistemological assumptions run deeper and more
broadly.
Pragmatism is an epistemological approach that might be effective at the
level of policy making. It is an approach that brings together the expertise of
various policy networks and gets them to reach their best judgments about
how to address social problems in ways that reconcile various goals. But it is
not an approach that addresses satisfactorily the larger political culture. Citi-
zens have difficulty following the complexities of various economic stimulus
policies, the nuances of public health proposals, the sort of environmental reg-
ulations that could reduce global warming, or effective strategies for combat-
ing terrorism. The political opposition can easily manipulate public opinion.
Conservative Republicans can label Obama’s pragmatic reforms as liberal ex-
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tensions of governmental power in their lives, rather than as efforts to respond
to consensual concerns.
To counter such manipulation, pragmatism must be supplemented by rea-
sonable claims that pragmatic reforms reflect consensual ideals. If widespread
agreement can be attained on a wide range of ideals that compose the Ameri-
can consensus, these ideals can be used to justify certain pragmatic experiments
and to criticize and even “veto” others that clearly violate consensual norms.
But if the objective is to justify or condemn various political decisions, mini-
mizing disagreement may not be so important. Diverse reasonable justifica-
tions drawn from various doctrines and ideologies may all be useful in this
task.
This leads to the most important epistemological issue: how can we attain
intersubjective knowledge about what are our reasonable consensual ideals?
As an alternative to “convergence,” pluralists can construct a large “toolbox”
that contains our common sensibilities. Perhaps a better metaphor is that
“playlists” containing many ideals arranged according to answers provided to
the enduring questions of politics might be developed. While this article has
suggested some such ideals, the contents of our consensus must be socially con-
structed and affirmed. Proposals for inclusion on the pluralist playlist should
not be based on complex philosophical speculations; they must pay attention
to common experiences and shared beliefs. The ideals of principled pluralism
must be framed in ways that appeal to common sense. This involves appeal-
ing less to what particular citizens have habitually come to see as “common
sense” than to common sensibilities—the ideals that are intersubjectively ac-
cepted.
Much depends on how our social understandings are articulated. For ex-
ample, the American welfare state is highly controversial, perhaps because
overly thick principles have been articulated as being necessary to it. “Govern-
ment must redistribute material resources from the rich to the poor,” “ceil-
ings must be placed on the resources owned and controlled by the rich,” and
“the poor have welfare rights” are examples of fairly thick principles that
make programs to reduce poverty so controversial. A less controversial prin-
ciple is that “government has a responsibility to provide financial support for
the poor, the sick, the young, the elderly, and the physically, mentally, and
emotionally disabled.”17 Of course, this principle is fairly thin, but it is po-
tent enough to guide the resolution of many specific issues that involve social
17. See Schumaker and Kelly (2013) for research suggesting that such a “floors” principle
is more effective than related expressions of support for social justice in reaching decisions
that increase public assistance to the disadvantaged.
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justice. Both Rawls and Obama seem to recognize that few people are so hard-
hearted as to deny this ideal as part of American common sense.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Principled pluralism proposes a broad array of political principles and phil-
osophical assumptions that can be appreciated by people as part of the un-
derlying ideas of the political cultures in which they reside. This proposal is
consistent with Connolly’s view that pluralism is not about narrowing our
political beliefs, but rather about broadening our receptivity toward others
and the diversity of their beliefs.
Principled pluralism is not an absolute or static public philosophy, even for
those like Obama who articulate and generally follow its ideals. Sometimes
Obama’s pluralism has been trumped by his liberalism, well illustrated by his
executive actions since the elections in November 2014 to shield undocu-
mented immigrants from deportation, to enter into international agreements
to curb global warming, and to open relations with Cuba. But another way of
understanding these actions is to see Obama as trying to move the pluralist
consensus in a liberal direction.
Many Americans remain fairly intolerant and reject some equal rights
stressed by principled pluralism. Yet Obama has given voice to the hope that
these and other principles can be more widely accepted and that there is a
plausible path to achieving a broader consensus in support of these ideals in
the not distant future. Fifty years ago, our consensus supporting equal rights
for minorities and women was much less than it is now. Our consensus sup-
porting equal rights for LGBTQs seems to be expanding rapidly. It may take
some time for a consensus to emerge behind the right to heath care as em-
bodied in Obamacare, but welfare programs such as Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid now enjoy broad support—even if they are subject to the sort of
revisions that Obama recognizes as a normal part of pluralist politics.
John Rawls would probably accept principled pluralism as a public phi-
losophy aimed at providing accessible and understandable justifications for
political processes, decisions, and programs that can often be acceptable to
partisans—though perhaps reluctantly and with reservations. Principled plu-
ralism seems consistent with Rawls’s inclusive conception of the overlapping
consensus.
It is too early to assess fully Obama’s presidency, but his receptivity to those
having various religious and moral doctrines and competing partisan outlooks,
his efforts to justify his decisions and policies in terms of consensual under-
standings, and his efforts to move American political culture to a broader un-
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derstanding of its ideals must be appreciated. The argument here is that John
Rawls would likely applaud Obama’s efforts in these areas.
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